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I. Different Perspectives on Corruption
Societies may differ in their views as to what constitutes
corruption, although the concept finds universal manifestations.
Experts have different perspectives on the meaning, causes, and
effects of this universal phenomenon. While a few take an inter-
disciplinary approach, positions are more often influenced by the
respective discipline. The literature on the subject is vast and
diversified. Any attempt to summarize it here would not do it
justice. It may be useful, however, to begin this paper by sharing
with the reader some of the main findings based on that literature.
Some economic writings tend to define corruption as a situation
where the benefit (to a corrupt agent) of acting against the expecta-
tion of a principal outweighs the cost, or where a public good,
service or office is sold for personal gain.' Others describe it in
terms of the exploitation of economic rents which arise from the
monopoly position of public officials.2 In either sense, to quote
one economist, corruption "provides a market price where a market
is not allowed."3  Economists find the causes of corruption
embedded in the country's economic and administrative struc-
tures. 4 They note its prevalence where government intervention
exceeds its ability to intervene efficiently and where discretion in
the allocation of public goods, services or subsidies is great, the risk
of punishment is low and the pay-offs are sufficiently attractive. A
broader view takes into account government policies (e.g. the level
of civil service wages or import tariffs) and may further look into
the honesty and integrity of both public officials and private
individuals. Holding these factors constant, however, this view
determines the incidence and size of corruption by the level of
benefits available, the riskiness of corrupt deals and the relative
bargaining power of its source and beneficiary.' Economists are
1. See R. KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 22 (1988); A. Shleifer &
R. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. OF ECON. 599 (1993); M. Naim, The Corruption
Eruption, II BROWN J.W. AFF. 245, 248 (1995).
2. See M. BEENSTOCK, ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION (1977).
3. R. Klitgaard, Bribes, Tribes and Markets that Fail: Rethinking the
Economics of Underdevelopment, 11 DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 481
(1994).
4. R. KLITGAARD, supra note 1, at 38-47; see E. Mason, Corruption and
Development 17-30 (Harvard Institute for International Development Discussion
Paper No. 50, 1978).
5. See S. Rose-Ackerman, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION -
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (WORLD BANK, VIEWPOINT NOTE NO. 74, 1996)
(hereinafter THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION), S. ROSE-ACKERMAN,
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also concerned about the effect of corruption on growth and
development. They see bribery, when freely offered and accepted,
as serving the immediate interest of the parties to it. As for the
interests of the society, some writers have found corruption an
important source of capital formation, which could promote
flexibility and efficiency in the market and advance entrepreneur-
ship.6 Others have concluded, on the basis of questionnaires and
interviews with businessmen, that a lack of political credibility
(faith in the stability of government policies) was much more
harmful than corruption, which they viewed "more as a variable
cost than as uncertainty factor."7  Other economists distinguish
between "efficient" and "inefficient" bribes depending on the
underlying regulation, arguing that a bribe to avoid regulations
which restrict competition increases efficiency.' Beyond this
efficiency argument, and in spite of the dearth of empirical
research, an emerging consensus in modern economic writings
seems to suggest that the long term effects of corruption on
competition in the market, the investment climate and the people's
welfare are disruptive and inequitable and that such negative
effects tend to increase with the degree of monopoly in the
provision of goods and services.9 The vested interests established
through corrupt practices tend to weaken public institutions and
CORRUPTION 9 (1978) (hereinafter CORRUPTION).
6. See J. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,
61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 421-22 (1967). Professor Nye, a political scientist, who
approaches the subject from an economist's point of view, is one of the most
quoted sources for the argument that corruption can be useful for a country's
economy.
7. S. BORNER, ET AL., POLITICAL CREDIBILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT 58-61 (1995) (distinguishing between different forms of corruption and
suggesting that some forms while having potentially serious distributional effects,
may not be too damaging to economic activity as a whole).
8. See, e.g., N. Leff, Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption,
in BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: TOWARD A SEARCH
FOR CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 325 (M. Epko ed., 1979) (hereinafter BUREAU-
CRATIC CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA).
9. See CORRUPTION, supra note 5, at 88; A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, Corrup-
tion, 108 Q.J. OF ECON. 599, 600 (1993); P. Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110
QJ. OF ECON. 681 (1995) (representing one of the few empirical studies finding
a correlation between corruption and economic growth in the sense that the less
corruption there is, the higher the GDP growth rate); P. WARD, CORRUPTION,
DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY 170 (1989) (emphasizing the negative effect of
corruption on the income distribution in developing countries).
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delay attempts to reform the system, thus inhibiting the develop-
ment of new activities and reducing economic growth. °
Political science speaks of corruption as a symptom of more
deeply rooted problems in the society's structure related in
particular to the means of attaining and maintaining power and the
weak or non-existent safeguards against its abuse. Accordingly,
they address this phenomenon in different patterns of the exercise
of power and of outsiders' political influence on public offices. For
many political scientists, the main causes of corruption are to be
found in political structures. Some attribute it to those structures
which are characterized by the lack of democratic rule. 1 They are
aware that widespread corruption can be found under democratic
governments, but find assurance in the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system.' 2 They also seek to develop
ways to reduce the opportunities for political corruption, including
collusion between legislators and bureaucrats, and to increase the
awareness and participation of voters in the democratic process
especially through the efforts of civil society.3 Political scientists
differ on the effects of corruption, with some distinguishing
between "integrative" (positive) and "disintegrative" (negative)
forms of corruption. 4 However, a growing consensus is also
emerging among political scientists on the adverse impact of
corruption on political and bureaucratic stability and efficiency. To
quote one of them, "[corruption] privatizes valuable aspects of
public life, bypassing processes of representation, debate and
choice."' 5
Legal literature generally treats corruption in the context of the
deviation (for private gains) from binding rules, the arbitrary
exercise of discretionary powers and the illegitimate use of public
10. See S. Knack & Ph. Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207, 227
(no. 3 1995).
11. See, e.g., G. MYRDAL, CORRUPTION - ITS CAUSES AND EFFECTS, IN ASIAN
DRAMA: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NATIONS 951, 952 (vol. II, 1968)
(a professor of economics writing this article from a political perspective); C.
FRIEDRICH, THE PATHOLOGY OF POLITICS: VIOLENCE, BETRAYAL, CORRUPTION,
SECRECY AND PROPAGANDA 127, 128 (1972).
12. See M. Johnston, Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable
Democracy: When Politics and Corruption Meet, in CORRUPTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 83, 67 (K.A. Elliott ed., 1997).
13. Id. at 24-27; ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION, supra note 5, at 12.
14. See M. Johnston, The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassess-
ment, 18 COMP. POL. 459, 464 (1986).
15. D. Thompson, Mediated Corruption - The Case of the Keating Five, 87 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 369 (1993).
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resources.16 Lawyers address it in the implementation of econo-
mic, administrative and criminal law and in the performance of
fiduciary duties in particular, noting its spread when law enforce-
ment is weak and the probability of detection and punishment is
low.17 They agree on its devastating effect on the rule of law
which, through corruption, is substituted for by the rule of whoever
has the influence or the ability and willingness to pay.18 They are
particularly concerned when corruption reaches the ranks of the
judiciary and distorts the system of justice.19 And they are
increasingly aware of the need for rules to address situations of
conflict of interests and for the protection of state assets from
corrupt and fraudulent practices.
Sociology finds corruption a "social relationship" represented
in the violation of socially accepted norms of duty and welfare.20
Social scientists speak of it at times in patron-client terms. Some
describe it as a form of "patrimonialism" which is strongest in
societies where communities are small and interactive relationships
are highly personal, and the need to accumulate "social capital" is
21great. Others consider it an indicator of a dysfunctional society.
They generally attribute it to historical and socio-cultural factors
resulting from conflicts between different groups and varied values
within the society.22 It thrives, they say, in the conflict of values.
16. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 345 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
corruption as "[t]he act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others").
17. See, e.g., R. Ogren, The Ineffectiveness of the Criminal Sanction in Fraud
and Corruption Cases: Losing the Battle against White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. GRIM.
L. REV. 959, 987 (1973); A. Morice, Corruption, loi et societd: quelques proposi-
tions, 36 TIERS MONDE 41 (1995).
18. See, e.g., ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION, supra note 5, at 81-83; A.
Block, American Corruption and the Decline of the Progressive Ethos, 23 J.L. &
SOC'Y 18 (1996) (noting that "there is a loss of faith in the United States of
America today in public institutions because of the sense that they do not work
as intended, for they . . . have been corrupted...").
19. See, e.g., M. Zalman, Can We Cure Judicial Corruption, 66 MICH. B.J. 365
(1987); J. Ramsyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative
Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994).
20. See, e.g., M. Defleur, Corruption, Law and Justice, 23 J. GRIM. JUST. 243
(1995) (defining corruption as a "colonization of social relations in which two or
more actors undertake an exchange relation by way of a successful transfer of the
steering media of money or power, thereby sidestepping the legally prescribed
procedure to regulate the relation.").
21. See V. Tanzi, Corruption, Governmental Activities and Markets
(International Monetary Fund 1994).
22. See, e.g., J. Scott, The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations, in
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, supra note 8, at 29, 31;
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While they also recognize negative and positive effects of corrup-
tion, their more recent studies emphasize such negative aspects as
adverse effects on development and on national integration.'
Public administration specialists are concerned with bureaucra-
tic corruption, even though they realize that this is but one form of
a more complex phenomenon. They see corruption in the abuse of
public resources and the use of public offices for private gains
contrary to prescribed norms.24 They say that it undermines the
implementation (and sometimes the making) of public policy. They
attribute it mainly to poor pay of public officials, monopoly of
public services, wide personal discretion, weak financial control
systems, excessive regulation and procedures, and the failure to
build a strong internal culture of public service and ethics.' They
also agree on its overall negative impact where the allocation of
public goods and services becomes the privilege of who pays first
or most.26  They are particularly alarmed by the intrusion of
political corruption into the bureaucracy and the possible collusion
between politicians and senior bureaucrats against public interest.
Business organizations treat corruption mostly as a trade and
investment policy issue. While they are concerned about its impact
on the volume and cost of transactions, their major worry is the
uncertainty it brings to business dealings and their inability to
predict the outcome of competition when corruption is wide-
R. Braibanti, Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption, in BUREAUCRATIC
CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, supra note 8, at 11.
23. See, e.g., Introduction to Part Ill, in BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA, supra note 7, at 307-09; W. Easterley & R. Levine, Africa's
Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions 2 (World Bank Draft Working
Paper, 1996).
24. See, e.g., G. Caiden & N. Caiden, Administrative Corruption, 37 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 301, 302 (1977).
25. See, e.g., A. BENT, THE POLITICS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT: CONFLICT AND
POWER IN URBAN COMMUNITIES 3-6 (1974) (particularly discussing the cause of
too broad discretionary powers of public officials); B. Schaffer, Access: A Theory
of Corruption and Bureaucracy, 6 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 357 (1986).
26. See, e.g., Introduction to Part 11, in BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA, supra note 8, at 308.
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spread.27 Some, especially in developed countries, worry about its
impact on company values and financial controls.
Practically all people who publicly address corruption condemn
it, even though it would not exist at a wide scale without the
participation of many. In the poor countries, most people take it
as a fact of life, an unalterable part of the rules of the game which
they have no choice but to accept. Their perception of its scope
may even exceed its real dimensions.
Most people recognize corruption as an additional cost, which
some consider necessary to get things done (and by doing so,
contribute to making it necessary). Some see corruption broadly
as a violation of human rights and, at the extreme, as a "crime
against humanity."'
All agree it may increase the wealth of those practicing it but
almost certainly reduces the revenue of the state and the welfare
of society as a whole.
Yet corruption in one form or another exists in varying
degrees in all human societies. Like other immoral practices, its
egregious manifestations have been recognized and condemned
since old times in practically all cultures; it continues nonetheless
to be widely practiced at all social levels.
II. Corruption As I See It
I use the word "corruption" here in a broad sense encompas-
sing different forms of behavior. This behavior usually results from
two types of situations. The first is where, in the allocation of
benefits or even the mere allowance of opportunities, the tempta-
tion to realize private gains prevails over the duty to serve other
interests which are usually common interests. And the second is
where, in the application of rules, the opportunity to grant special
27. In its 1977 and 1996 Rules of Conduct, the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), an international non-governmental organization having 7,000
member companies and business associations in more than 130 countries,
condemns corrupt practices by member enterprises in connection with internation-
al commercial transactions because of their negative impact on international trade
and international competition. See F. Heimann, Combatting International
Corruption: The Role of the Business Community in CORRUPTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 147 (K.A. Elliott ed., 1997). In 1995, under the auspices of
the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, a "Davos Group" was formed
to work on an agenda to catalyze the adoption of international standards for
business ethics and regulation.
28. Corruption in Government 24 (United Nations 1990), TCD/Sem. 90/2,
INT-89-R56 (Report of an Interregional Seminar held in the Hague, the
Netherlands on Dec. 11-15, 1989).
1997] CORRUPTION AND THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 459
favors undermines the general obligation to apply public rules
without discrimination. In situations where rules are being
circumvented, are applied with unwarranted differentiation, or are
simply non-existent, a corrupt agent, acting on his own or at the
behest of others, typically chooses to give preference to special
interests over the broader interests he is legally required to serve.
The resources put at his disposal or the office he holds are being
used, or rather abused, in ways different from those set out by his
principal. The principal varies according to the situation. It may
be the agent's supervisors, the institution for Which he works, the
owners of such an institution or the public at large.
In this broad sense, corruption occurs when a function,
whether public or private, requires the allocation of benefits or the
provision of a good or service. The agent may have the opportuni-
ty to perform this function in the absence of any or adequate prior
rules, substantive or procedural, and may thus have great discretion
and a vast opportunity to make personal choices. He may also be
acting when pre-established rules exist but chooses to violate them
to achieve private profit for himself and his bribers. Alternatively,
he may apply the rules as written but selectively, to benefit himself,
his family, friends or whoever pays him for the favor. In all cases,
a position of trust is being exploited to realize private gains beyond
what the position holder is entitled to. Attempts to influence the
position holder, through the payment of bribes or an exchange of
benefits or favors, in order to receive in return a special gain or
treatment not available to others is also a form of corruption, even
if the gain involved is not illicit under applicable law. The absence
of rules facilitates the process as much as the presence of cumber-
some or excessive rules does.
Corruption in this sense is not confined to the public sector
and, in that sector, is not confined to administrative bureaucracies.
It is not limited to the payment and receipt of bribes. It takes
various forms and is practiced under all forms of government,
including well established democracies. It can be found in the
legislative, judicial and executive branches of government as well
as in all forms of private sector activities. It is not exclusively
associated with any ethnic, racial or religious group. However, its
level, scope and impact vary greatly from one country to another
and may also vary, at least for a while, within the same country
from one place to another. While corruption of some form or
another may inhere in every human community, the system of
governance has a great impact on its level and scope of practice.
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Systems can corrupt people as much as, if not more than, people
are capable of corrupting systems.
Some cultures seem to be more tolerant than others when it
comes to certain forms of corruption, particularly favoritism and
petty bribes. In some societies, favoritism is so pervasive in human
behavior that those who, in the performance of their public
functions, decline to favor friends and relatives are generally
criticized as being unhelpful or unkind. Petty bribes are also seen
in many countries as a charity, an advance incentive or expression
of gratitude, or an acceptable substitute for the low pay of public
officials - not the extortion it is recognized to be in other countries.
Such cultural variations, though real, should not be taken as
acceptable excuses for what is basically a corrupt behavior.
Corruption may be petty or grand, sporadic or systemic, casual
or entrenched but the widespread practice of any of its forms has
devastating effects in all societies:
* In the application of law, it creates a different law in practice
from the one in the books. It transforms public rules and
procedures based on democratic or meritocratic principles
into ad hoc practices based on the willingness and ability to
pay or on personal connections and reciprocated favors.
" In the practice of government, corruption turns the rule of
law to a rule of individuals pursuing their private interests.
It gives special interests priority over the public interest
represented by majority rule. Its spread undermines public
confidence in government and the government's ability to
implement policies, leading to the weakening and possible
disruption of democratic systems and in the extreme to the
collapse of the public order. Collusion between political
corruption and bureaucratic corruption is bound to acceler-
ate this process. While this tends to destabilize political
structures, spreading the benefits of corruption has often
been used, however, as a stabilizing tool, especially under
non-democratic governments.
29
" In the working of most economies, the impact of corruption
is not less harmful, whether we look at market or non-
market economies. While the phenomenon is complex and
the cost may fall on other areas and in future times, corrup-
tion can endanger the use of economic choices, increase the
costs of transactions, reduce state revenue, increase public
29. See Rose-Ackerman, CORRUPTION, supra note 5, at 80-1.
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expenditures, penalize law abiders and produce adverse
distributional effects. It is likely to tax the system in its
entirety, although it works in particular against the poor and
the underprivileged. Its prevalence could over time threaten
macro-economic stability, raise the rate of inflation and push
business into the informal sector. The scope and adverse
impact of corruption, or at least the eruption of cases of
corruption,30 tend to increase in the periods of transition
from non-market to a market system, and from a totalitarian
to an open political system.
" In the application of environmental rules and procedures,
corruption may enable those addressed by them, both in the
public as well as the private sectors, to violate applicable
standards, turning ideal environment laws and regulations
into meaningless gestures for those who have the money or
the influence.
" In all cases, and however you look at it, corruption deepens
inequities. In doing so, it sows the seeds for social and
political tensions, threatens the very fabric of society and
undermines the effectiveness of the state and the political
legitimacy of government.31
Once corruption finds its way in a certain place or sector, like
a virus, it tends to spread out to other areas and sectors. It does
not stop at political boundaries and it grows faster in environments
of under-regulation or over-regulation. Corrupt and corrupting
individuals have a vested interest in spreading the perception that
corruption is dominant and prevalent. Through them, it becomes
self-perpetuating. Foreign business, especially in developing
countries, often contributes to the spread of corruption by assuming
that pay-offs and connections are inevitable facts of doing business
- an attitude which often turns out to be a self-fulfilling prophe-
cy.32 If unchecked, corruption eventually distorts the values of the
society, except for the few who manage to insulate themselves
through strong moral shields, often based on strict religious and
ethical values. Its effect on the society and on individuals in that
society is thus as destructive as it is far reaching. Any short-term
30. See M. Naim, The Corruption Eruption, supra note 1, at 246 (1995)
(arguing that the greater disclosure of corruption in recent years is a sign that
democracy and markets are working).
31. See Rose-Ackerman, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION, supra
note 5.
32. Naim, supra note 1, at 255.
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benefits it may bring (such as practically deregulating a heavily
regulated economy or "greasing the wheels" of business transac-
tions) will most likely be outweighed by the collective damage
corruption is bound to bring about beyond the specific transaction
at hand. Even at the transactional level, corruption often increases
inefficiency in government projects and may raise the cost of public
and private procurement alike. Quite often, large illicit payments,
far from being invested in the country, are transferred abroad or
diverted into other illegal business. Corruption may also increase
the public debt of the country as a result of the higher cost of
externally funded contracts secured through corrupt or fraudulent
practices.
In short, corruption, in spite of some returns for its beneficia-
ries, retards the overall development of societies and their systems
of governance. Historically, it declined with the rise of civilizations
and increased with their fall. Its level and pace of growth may thus
have an inverse relationship with the degree of development.
III. Efforts to Combat Corruption
Attempts to combat corruption may have a greater chance of
success if they recognize from the outset the complexity of this
phenomenon and the impossibility of eliminating it altogether.
Those who are determined to fight corruption must realize that it
results from forces which have accumulated over a long period of
time and that it takes strong commitments as well as laborious and
lengthy efforts to overcome such formidable forces. They are best
advised to avoid simplistic solutions and the narrow approaches
typically advocated in different social disciplines. A comprehensive
approach encompassing the experiences of different disciplines and
countries will inevitably consist of short-term and long-term
measures which may have both domestic and international
dimensions. It should address the economic, political, social, legal,
administrative and moral aspects of the phenomenon and recognize
the close linkages among these aspects. It must recognize that
different types of corruption may need to be addressed by different
strategies and methods. It cannot ignore that the prevalence of
corruption is often based on deeply rooted causes related to the
values with which people grow up and the system which governs
their relationships, both among themselves and with their govern-
ment. For this reason, a successful approach must also take into
account the educational and mass communications' processes which
influence such values and system of governance. The synergistic
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effects of all the measures included in this approach are likely to
produce positive results over time. However, curbing corruption
requires continued commitment by an adequate number of people
as well as an a priori acceptance of possible frustration and failure.
A comparative survey of the literature, including different
attempts by governments to combat corruption, leads to placing the
emphasis on certain areas of reform which may have particular
relevance in this respect. Although, these relate mainly to govern-
ment action, there is also a need for complementary efforts by
business groups such as the adoption of international and domestic
codes of conduct and internal systems for compliance with applica-
ble law and codes against extortion and bribery.33 Nor should the
measures stated below obscure the fact that efforts to combat
corruption have a much greater chance of success when they are
not confined to the high ranks of government but become the
responsibility of the largest possible numbers of individuals, acting
individually and collectively through non-governmental organiza-
tions.
A. Economic Reform
Although macro- and micro-economic reforms may not
necessarily target corruption as a specific objective, they do have
a major positive effect on the situations which give rise to it.34 On
the general level, the adoption of sound development strategies
creates an environment of hope in the future in the economy as a
whole. The loss of such a hope contributes to the shift towards
corrupt practices for many of those who see in them the only
chance for the betterment of their own conditions. Liberalization
of markets, demonopolization of services, and deregulation (i.e.
reducing regulations to the level needed to protect competition and
ensure transparency and accountability) certainly decrease the
opportunities for arbitrary and corrupt practices on the part of
public officials. The positive effects of these measures, especially
in areas such as foreign trade (imports and exports licenses),
33. See examples in "Corporate Anti-Corruption Programs - A Survey of Best
Practices" prepared by the US Chapter of Transparency International in June
1996.
34. See, e.g., World Development Report - From Plan to Market 95-6 (World
Bank 1996) (listing economic measures such as transparent privatization, liberaliza-
tion, demonopolization of the economy, and deregulation as measures which,
according to Bank experience, have produced the scope for corruption and are
supposed to also have this effect, if applied, in transition economies).
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taxation (tax structures and administration, including customs), and
entry and exit barriers for investment have been proven in many
countries. Such effects are clearest when these measures are
coupled with the'development or strengthening of institutions
which supervise the proper implementation of remaining regula-
tions and ensure their effectiveness. In the absence of strong and
effective institutions, economic liberalization may become counter-
productive. It may increase the chances for corruption and create
a vacuum for organized crime to fill. Even privatization authorities
and regulatory institutions can themselves be subject to corruption.
In addition to general economic reform measures, specific anti-
corruption actions enhance the chances of success. These may
include the imposition of user fees for government services (with
a simultaneous increase in the salaries of public employees,
practically replacing illicit bribes), or reducing the discretionary
distribution of benefits (especially subsidized food and public
housing allocations which can be delivered at market prices, with
cash payments to the needy) as well as similar measures which, to
the extent possible, replace administrative approvals with market
mechanisms, thus obviating the need for influencing the officials in
charge and reducing the scope for rent seeking. Governments must
be careful however as all these measures may easily be exploited
in the absence of efficient regulatory regimes and strong superviso-
ry institutions.
B. Legal and Judicial Reform
Clarifying and streamlining the necessary laws and eliminating
the unnecessary ones, strengthening the law enforcement capacity
in the country while putting in place measures to ensure an
efficient and just judicial process are not only general steps
required for the creation of a sound investment climate;35 they are
also necessary for reducing the incidence of corruption.36 Specific
laws may also be issued to introduce a greater measure of transpa-
35. On the role of legal and judicial reform for private sector development, see
I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD, Vol. II, 127-82 (1995),
Chapter Three (Legal Framework for Development and the Role of the World
Bank in Legal Technical Assistance) and Chapter Four (Judicial Reform in
Developing Countries and the Role of the World Bank).
36. See generally ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION, supra note 5, Part II on
bureaucratic corruption. See also World Development Report - From Plan to
Market 95 (World Bank 1996) (identifying uncertain rules and heavy regulation
in many economy-related areas as causes of corruption and calling for legal order
to reduce corruption).
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rency in government actions, to regulate procurement of goods and
services for the government on a competitive basis and impose
deterrent procedures on corrupting bidders, to create investigative,
monitoring and evaluating authorities, to prohibit bribery of both
local and foreign officials, and to impose severe punishment on
both the giver and recipient of bribes, to end tax deductibility of
bribes, to impose strict corporate auditing, accounting and disclo-
sure rules, to forfeit corruptly gained assets and contracts, to
protect witnesses and informers, and to reverse the burden of proof
in cases of unjustified enrichment in order to facilitate the often
elusive attempts to capture corrupt officials. Legislative action may
also address political corruption by criminalizing bribery (and other
advantages) of members of and candidates for law-making bodies
and officials of public parties.
Such legislative anti-corruption measures may not be effective,
however, in the absence of honest and efficient investigative and
judicial bodies. Increasing the remuneration and training of clerks,
prosecutors and judges and enhancing their career development
opportunities as well as protecting their independence contribute
greatly to the fight against corruption. The establishment of an
anti-corruption commission, an ombudsman's office and the like
may also be helpful, although experience has been mixed in this
respect. Corruption is rampant in some countries with several such
offices, filled with low-paid and ill-trained staff at all levels. Worse
still, these offices have been actively used in some instances by
incumbent governments against their political enemies.
C. Administrative (Civil Service) Reform
As in the cases of economic and legal/judicial reforms, general
administrative reform (especially in the revenue-collecting depart-
ments) can significantly reduce corruption.37 Reform of the civil
service may also include specific measures which directly address
this phenomenon. Obviously, the issue here is not merely the
reduction of the size of the civil service, necessary as this may be.
37. See generally ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION, supra note 5, Part II on
bureaucratic corruption, and World Development Report - From Plan to Market
95-6 (World Bank 1996) (listing some administrative reform measures such as the
strengthening of oversight and appeal mechanisms, as well as the increase in public
officials salaries, etc. as efficient anti-corruption efforts). See also Corruption in
Government 12-17 (United Nations 1990), TCD/Sem. 90/2, INT-89-R56 (Report
of an Interregional Seminar held in the Hague, the Netherlands on Dec. 11-15,
1989).
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The required general reform includes as well all the measures
needed to ensure efficiency and honesty of the civil service. Of
particular relevance are:
" the restructuring of the civil service to make it responsive to
actual needs;
" the streamlining of administrative rules and procedures,
especially by eliminating meaningless approvals and pro-
grams riddled with corruption;
" the introduction of competition between government
agencies and the private sector in the delivery of public
services and the supply of goods;
" the professionalization of the service through adequate
remuneration (especially for officials with discretionary
powers over distribution of benefits), continuous training,
skilled management, objective systems of recruitment and
promotion based on qualification and performance and
improved definition of tasks and work standards;
" the promotion of ethics in the civil service through the
enactment and enforcement of clear rules governing conflicts
of interest, elaboration on expected behavior, obligatory
disclosure of assets and investments above a certain thresh-
old (including those of dependents) and meaningful sanctions
in cases of violation;
" paying special attention to the selection of managers, both
from the professional and ethical viewpoints, and applying to
them an effective system of incentives and sanctions;
" increasing the public's awareness of their rights to govern-
ment services and the channels available to them for
submission of complaints, while strengthening the capacity of
these channels and access to administrative and judicial
remedies;
* introducing an effective system of financial management,
including serious and timely record keeping, auditing and
supervision of performance, especially in the procurement of
goods and services and the execution of public works;
" adoption of clear legislation and regulations on public
procurement generally based on the principle of competitive
bidding;
" adequate regulation, staffing and equipment in the agencies
in charge of combating tax evasion and money laundering,
including rewards and punishments needed to ensure
effective compliance and implementation; and
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* creation of oversight bodies and offices of client advocates
to receive complaints from the public, as checks and balanc-
es throughout the bureaucracy.
Such general administrative reforms may also be complemen-
ted by specific anti-corruption techniques, such as creating several
offices to provide the same function (e.g., to issue driving licenses
or passports), in order to reduce the monopoly rents of a single
outlet and allow the public to opt out of the corrupt ones. They
may also include anti-corruption measures, such as anti-bribery laws
which impose penalties representing a multiple of the marginal
benefits of the pay-offs, not just the amounts paid or received, in
addition to mandatory dismissal of corrupt officials, and the
disqualification (from bidding for government contracts or services)
of corrupt firms or individuals and regulating the payment of
commissions for public contracts with a view to limiting them to
appropriate remuneration for legitimate services, if not eliminating
them altogether.
D. Other Institutional Reforms
The above reforms may not produce their desired effect in the
absence of a system of government endowed with adequate checks
and balances to prevent collusion between the separate branches of
government and the emergence of de facto centers of power which
act above the law. Depending on the circumstances of each
country, the introduction of such a system may require a massive
effort of political reform, along with broad access to information
and a free press. This, of course, may not always be feasible and
cannot at any rate be sustained if it is merely imposed from the
outside. However, political reform may gradually develop from
within the society, through the elimination of illiteracy, the
strengthening of the education system, the development of civil
society, the liberalization of economy, the building up of the
citizens' confidence in their state's political and economic system,
and the adoption of measures of legal and judicial reform to
establish the rule of law, especially with emphasis on the due
process of law.
Nothing in the above suggests that democratic governments are
immune from corruption; it simply indicates that the more checks
and balances exist within a society, and the more strong institutions
are in place to protect such checks and balances, in an overall
environment of liberalization, the fewer opportunities there may be
for corrupt practices which remain unchecked or unpunished.
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Electoral laws can also be used to curb political corruption. They
should regulate political contributions and provide for their disclo-
sure. Immunity of members of Parliament should not be invoked
in cases of alleged bribes or extortion to them or by them.
E. Moral Reform
Underlying all reforms is the commitment of the reformers, the
pressure from the civil society that sustains this commitment, and
the ability of the leadership to influence the public. "This usually
requires high moral standards at the leadership level. Such
standards normally reflect the common aspiration of the society
and are often embedded in the teachings of its predominant
religion and ethics. It is not uncommon, however, to note a wide
gap between such teachings and peoples' day-to-day behavior.
Rather than attempting to narrow this gap through a combination
of reinterpreting the teachings and reforming the behavior, most
societies are content to live with it and to see it widening further
over time. The effect on the level of corruption is then inevitable.
If corruption becomes rampant, combating it would require a
major change in moral behavior. The issue here is hardly the lack
of an agreed set of moral values, but rather the prevalent hypocrisy
which confines these values to public postures, with little impact on
daily behavior. While a new moral movement, with or without
religious underpinnings, may emerge from time to time, it cannot
be always relied upon as a practical remedy. The attitude of the
elite in power can have demonstrable effects, however. The
behavior of parents at home, teachers at school, and political
leaders in and outside government inevitably influence the behavior
of a new generation. An ideology of austerity may be useful in a
poor society, but not if it is required only from the poor. Religious
teachings may also have little effect if the public has little faith in
the degree of their observance by those who are more privileged in
the society or by the religious establishment itself.
E International Measures
While domestic measures of reform such as those already
mentioned may help in checking corruption, certain corrupt
practices defy remedies by domestic measures alone. International
collaboration is particularly needed with respect to activities which
by their very nature are transboundary, such as corruption in
international business transactions and money laundering (especial-
ly in connection with illicit narcotics trafficking). It is required in
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particular to enhance the capacity of states which need assistance
in combating corruption and to strengthen mechanisms for
exchange of information and for mutual assistance in the investiga-
tion.
It should be noted, however, that international measures
addressing corruption are still in their infancy. Apart from the
international measures for the criminalization of money laundering
which started with the 1988 UN Convention Against Drug Traffic-
king,3" other international measures are the product of more
recent years (with the exception of the abortive attempt of the UN
Commission on Multilateral Corporations referred to later on).
Mostly regional in character, these measures have, for the most
part, taken so far the form of draft agreements or non-binding
recommendations.
At a universal level, the UN Commission on Transnational
Corporations completed in 1978 a draft International Agreement on
Illicit Payments. Covering both active and passive corruption, this
draft requires the criminalization of corruption in international
commercial transactions and establishes the jurisdictional basis for
the prosecution of this offense. It requires the parties to provide
for the obligation of transnational corporations to keep accurate
records of payments related to their international transactions. It
also requires civil sanctions for corrupt practices and mutual
assistance among the states parties to it. Late in 1995, the UN
resolved to reconvene work on this draft agreement. In December
1996, the General Assembly of the United Nations has also
adopted a Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in Interna-
tional Commercial Transactions by which states pledged to
criminalize bribery of foreign public officials and to deny the tax
38. Reference is to the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances which was open for signature on Dec. 20, 1988
and entered into force on Nov. 11, 1990. This convention establishes that illicit
trafficking in drugs and laundering of the proceeds from such trafficking shall be
criminal offenses in the state parties. The Convention also requires parties to it
to render mutual legal assistance with respect to the prosecution of the just
mentioned offenses and particularly with respect to search and seizures.
International measures against money laundering include, in addition to the above-
mentioned UN Convention, the 1988 Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of
the Banking System for the Purposes of Money-Laundering issued by the Basle
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, the 1990 Council
of Europe Convention of the Proceeds from Crime (in force), the 1991 EC
Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of
Money Laundering (in force), and the 1990 Forty Recommendations of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (created by the G-7 Summit in 1989) on
Money Laundering. The Forty FATF Recommendations were revised in 1996.
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deductibility of bribes paid by any private or public corporation or
individual of a UN member state to any public official or elected
representative of another country.
Recently, a Government Procurement Agreement covering the
purchase of goods and services including public works and public
utilities was prepared by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to
ensure that the international procurement process was open and
transparent. Only 24 WTO members are parties to this 1994
agreement which entered into force in January 1996. In the
meantime, participants at the WTO ministerial meeting in
December 1996 have agreed to negotiate an interim procurement
arrangement on transparency, openness and due process in
government procurement until such time as the 1994 agreement is
more widely accepted. A Working Group on Transparency in
Government Procurement has been established to facilitate the
negotiation of this interim agreement.
At the OECD level, two recommendations to governments
have been adopted. The 1994 Recommendation is directed against
"bribery of foreign public officials in connection with international
business transactions." Recommending the extra-territorial applica-
tion of bribery law, the Recommendation suggests the
criminalization of bribery and making its acts illegal in terms of
civil, commercial and administrative laws and regulations, along
with eliminating the indirect favoring of bribery in tax laws and
introducing company and business accounting requirements and
banking regulations to facilitate inspection and investigation as well
as the denial of public subsidies, licenses, and other public
advantages in cases of bribery. The 1994 Recommendation also
provides for cross boundary cooperation and consultation among
the relevant authorities, regular reviews, and international legal
assistance. By contrast to this broad recommendation, the 1996
OECD Recommendation is confined to the prohibition of tax
deductibility of bribes to foreign officials - a practice which seems
to have been tolerated earlier outside the United States. 39 In May
1987, the members of the OECD agreed to draft a treaty by the
39. It is interesting to note in this respect that the new Trans-Atlantic Agenda
(TA), a product of the 1995 United States-European Union Summit, urged EU
members to combat illicit payments by implementing the 1994 OECD Recommen-
dation. The private sector counterpart to the TA , the Trans-Atlantic Business
Dialogue, later formed a separate issues group to deal exclusively with bribery and
called on governments "to implement promptly the 1994 and 1996 OECD
recommendations."
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end of this year which would make it illegal for firms from member
countries to bribe foreign officials.
At the regional level, several multilateral attempts to curb
corruption have taken place. Among these is the one multilateral
anti-corruption agreement which has been signed by 23 countries
and has actually entered into force, the 1996 Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption prepared under the auspices of the
Organization of American States (OAS). This regional convention
is open for accession by non-OAS members. It requires the states
parties to take action against defined corrupt practices both within
their territories and, subject to their respective constitutions, those
committed by nationals and residents abroad. As defined in the
convention, the actions to be outlawed cover corruption both in its
active form (the offering or granting of any article of monetary
value or other benefit to a government official in exchange for any
act or omission in the performance of a public function) and
passive form (the solicitation or the acceptance by a government
official of such article or benefit for the same purpose). It also
covers the fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from
the afore-mentioned acts, the participation, in any manner, in their
commission or attempted commission, and other acts of corruption
which the states parties agree to include under the Convention.
Subject to the constitutional law of each member, the Convention
equally covers the offense of "illicit enrichment," that is any
unexplained significant increase (in relation to lawful earnings) in
the assets of a government official. (The U.S. delay in signing the
Convention has been justified by the possible inconsistency of this
latter requirement with the constitutional protection in the US
against self-incrimination.) In addition to requiring that such acts
of corruption be established as criminal offenses, and providing the
jurisdictional basis for such state actions (including the possible
extra-territorial application of bribery laws), the Convention also
provides for mutual assistance among the agencies of the states
parties in the investigation and prosecution of acts of corruption
and in the tracing and seizure of their proceeds. It prohibits states
parties from invoking bank secrecy as a basis for refusal to provide
such assistance. 4
40. In June 1996, the Council of Securities Regulations of the Americas
adopted a resolution on efforts to combat bribery of government officials by
publicly held companies and to develop and promote laws that address such illicit
payments, to strengthen auditing, assist in enforcing securities laws and improve
access by securities regulators to investigatory information.
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The charter of the North American Development Bank,
established under NAFTA, requires companies seeking loans from
that Bank to certify that they have not engaged in bribery and to
state that they have not been convicted of bribery within the past
five years.
A number of European draft conventions are also worth
mentioning. These include the two 1996 draft conventions which
the Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption of the Council of
Europe has still to finalize. The first of those is the draft Frame-
work Convention on Corruption which focuses on the criminal law
aspects of this phenomenon, requires the parties to outlaw
corruption (and the laundering of its proceeds) "at home- and
abroad," and prohibits the granting of tax deductions for bribes or
other economic advantages linked to corruption "whether benefited
at home or abroad." It also requires parties to adopt "appropriate
legislation" for the procurement of public goods and services and
for the restructuring of administrative procedures as well as codes
of conduct for elected representatives, freedom of the press,
auditing of businesses and the establishment of appropriate civil
law remedies for victims of corruption.
The second draft convention of the Council of Europe is the
draft Convention on Corruption. Unlike the previous one, this
draft convention provides a detailed definition of the forms of
corruption covered by this term. Those include both active and
passive bribery as well as the trading in influence over the decision-
making of public officials and money laundering. It is not limited
in scope to public officials. Also covered are private, including
foreign, entities, and senior officials of international organizations,,
elected representatives of international bodies and judges and
officials of international courts. The latter draft convention also
provides for cooperation and assistance between the parties in the
investigation of corrupt acts and in the confiscation of their
proceeds and the provision of additional remedies for their victims.
Other European initiatives include first a Protocol on Corrup-
tion to the EC Convention on the Protection of the Communities'
Financial Interests which was signed by the EU-Member States in
September 1996 and which criminalizes corruption in which
community and national officials are involved damaging or likely
to damage the European Communities' financial interests. Another
Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of
the European Communities as Officials of Member States of the
European Union has recently been signed by the Member States.
This Convention required EU Member States to make active and
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passive corruption involving community officials or officials of the
Member States a criminal offense. Corruption, committed by or
against government ministries, elected members of national parlia-
ments, members of the highest court or the court of auditors,
members of the Commission of the European Communities, the
European Parliament, the Court of Justice and the Court of
Auditors of the European Communities has equally to be crimina-
lize according to the Convention. The Convention also includes a
provision requiring Member States to hold heads of businesses for
the corrupt acts of persons under their authority criminally liable.
At a less formal level, the International Chamber of Commerce
issued in 1996 a revised version of its 1977 ICC Rules of Conduct
as a set of legally non-binding rules of ethical business conduct.
While these Rules appeal to public international organizations, such
as the World Bank, to take measures to combat corruption, they
basically address the behavior of member corporations. 41 They
prohibit corruption in a broad sense which includes extortion,
bribery, kick-backs, payments to agents which represent more than
the appropriate remuneration for legitimate services and contribu-
tions to political parties or committees or to individual politicians
if undisclosed and made in violation of applicable law. The Rules
also require proper financial recording and auditing by the
enterprises and introduce control and review procedures within
each enterprise to ensure compliance and sanctions against the
responsible director or employee contravening the Rules. They
also speak of the need for a code of conduct for each individual
company (with examples provided) and of coordination between
the ICC headquarters and its national committees in this field as
well as for the promotion of the Rules themselves on the domestic
and international levels.
Similarly, the International Bar Association issued in 1996 a
declaration recommending to governments the adoption of several
anti-corruption measures for international economic transactions
and calling on international financial institutions to take up the
matter in its activities.
42
41. See Heimann, supra note 27.
42. Similar, recent unofficial international declarations were issued by the
Council of Securities Regulations in the Americas (1996) and by the TransAtlantic
Business Dialogue in 1994 and 1996.
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IV. The World Bank's Efforts
A. The Bank's Growing Concern with Corruption Issues
The World Bank is required by its Articles of Agreement to
ensure that the proceeds of its loans will be used only for the
purposes for which they are granted and to disburse its loans only
as expenditures on the projects it finances are actually incurred 3
It is also required by these Articles to finance such expenditures
with due attention to considerations of "economy and efficiency,"
and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or
considerations.' The Articles of Agreement do not specifically
include curbing corruption among the Bank's purposes or functions.
They generally prohibit the Bank from taking non-economic
considerations into account in its decisions and from interfering in
the political affairs of its members.45 For this reason, the Bank
has traditionally been active and explicit in ensuring that procure-
ment under its own loans is done in a transparent manner and on
a competitive basis but has avoided, until very recently, any full-
fledged attempt to adopt an anti-corruption strategy. Since the
early 1990s, the Bank has, however, identified corruption as an
issue to be taken into account in its work on governance and, in a
few cases, begun to raise it in the country dialogue. It has also
sought to assist its borrowing countries in introducing economic,
administrative, legal and judicial reforms through a series of
43. See Article III, Section 5 (c), 2d sentence of the IBRD Articles of
Agreement (providing, inter alia, that "in the case of loans made by the Bank, it
shall open an account in the name of the borrower and the amount of the loan
shall be credited to this account in the currency or currencies in which the loan is
made. The borrower shall be permitted by the Bank to draw on this account only
to meet expenses in connection with the project as they are actually incurred").
See also Article V, Section 1(h) of the IDA Articles of Agreement (providing that
"[f]unds to be provided under any financing operation shall be made available to
the recipient only to meet expenses in connection with the project as they are
actually incurred").
44. See Article III, Section 5(b) of the IBRD Articles of Agreement (providing
that "[t]he Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan
are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention
to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or
other non-economic influences or considerations"). See also Article V, Section
1(g) of the IDA Articles of Agreement to the same effect.
45. See Article IV, Section 10 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement (stating that
"[t]he Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character
of the member or members concerned"). See also Article V, Section 10 of the
IDA Articles of Agreement to the same effect.
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structural and sectoral adjustment loans, technical assistance loans
and grants and sectoral investment loans. While the Bank was not
in this way directly involved in fighting corruption, it was aware
that these reforms have a direct positive effect not only on the
growth prospects of the borrowing countries but also on the level
of corruption.
The Bank's explicit concern with corruption as a general
development issue came with the assumption of James D.
Wolfensohn of its Presidency in mid-1995. Soon thereafter, he
highlighted the issue in his first speech before the Annual Meeting
of the Board of Governors (in September 1995). He then asked
this writer, as the Bank's General Counsel, to review all proposals
and consider initiatives for possible actions by the Bank. Detailed
discussion of such proposals and initiatives at the senior manage-
ment level led to specific action which has been approved by the
President and, as needed, by the Board of Executive Directors.
Such action covers a number of different fronts, all related to
measures deemed to be within the Bank's competence which will
be detailed below. In the meantime, a comprehensive strategy to
address corruption, both as an issue of the Bank's own effectiveness
and more generally as a development policy issue, is being
prepared for consideration by the Bank's Board in the near future.
Before addressing in the remaining part of this lecture past and
current actions of the Bank in combating corruption, it may be
useful to explain the reasons which prompt it, at this particular
stage, to take a leading role in this area.
The Bank's involvement in addressing corruption issues
beyond the projects it finances has not been free from controversy.
On the one hand, it can validly be argued that the Bank is not a
world government for the borrowing countries; its mandate is
defined by its Articles of Agreement. Being subject to a weighted
voting system and limited in its operations to the borrowing
countries, its role as a world reformer beyond its defined purposes
would inevitably carry the marks of rule by the rich countries of
the poorer ones. In any event, the Bank should only be concerned,
under this argument, with the functions provided for in its Articles
of Agreement, the main among which is to help finance specific
projects for productive purposes.' It should, in particular, avoid
46. See Article III, Section 4(vii) of the IBRD Articles of Agreement which
reads: "Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except under special
circumstances, be for the purpose of specific projects of reconstruction or
development." See also Article V, Section 1(b) of the IDA Articles of Agreement
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involvement in a subject matter which has obvious domestic
political connotations and could otherwise entangle the Bank in
complex political considerations which it is explicitly prohibited
from taking into account under its Articles.
It should nonetheless be stated that as the world's major
development finance institution and the coordinator of foreign aid
to many of its members, the Bank cannot realistically ignore issues
which significantly influence the effective flow and appropriate use
of external resources in its borrowing countries. It has already
been able to deal with a large number of governance and institu-
tional issues which have direct relevance to its development
mandate, without entanglement in partisan domestic politics. Its
concern with public sector management in its borrowing countries
has been an important factor in its operational and research work
through the years. Any intervention by the Bank would, at any
rate, take the form either of a financial instrument to which the
country involved would be a contracting party, as a borrower or
guarantor, or advice which must be related to the Bank's develop-
ment mandate. In neither case can the Bank take a coercive stance
or impose a particular direction on a borrowing member. It can
only play a facilitating role, the effectiveness of which would
depend largely on the borrower's full cooperation.
As a practical matter, the World Bank can hardly insulate itself
from major issues of international development policy. Corruption
has become such an issue. Its prevalence in a given country
increasingly influences the flow of public and private funds for
investment in that country. The Bank's lending programs and in
particular its adjustment, lending take into account factors which
determine the size and pace of such flows. From a legal viewpoint,
what matters is that the Bank's involvement must always be
consistent with its Articles of Agreement. The Bank can in my
view take many actions to help the fight against corruption. It can
conduct research on the causes and effects of this world-wide
phenomenon. It can provide assistance, by mutual agreement, to
enable its borrowing countries to curb corruption. It may take up
the level of corruption as a subject of discussion in the dialogue
with its borrowing members. And, if the level of corruption is high
so as to have an adverse impact on the effectiveness of Bank
assistance, according to factual and objective analysis, and the
government is not taking serious measures to combat it, the Bank
to the same effect.
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can take this as a factor in its lending strategy towards the country.
The only legal barrier in this respect is that in doing so the Bank
and its staff must be concerned only with the economic causes and
effects and should refrain from intervening in the country's political
affairs. While the task may be difficult in borderline cases, its
limits have been prescribed in detail in legal opinions issued by this
author and endorsed by the Bank's Board.47
According to one such legal opinion ("Governance Issues and
their Relevance to the Bank's Work" issued in December 1990),
the concept of governance in the sense of the overall management
of a country's resources cannot be irrelevant to an international
financial institution which at presentnot only finances projects but
also is deeply involved in the process of economic reform carried
out by its borrowing members. Clearly, the concern here is not
with the exercise of state powers in the broad sense but specifically
with the appropriate management of the public sector and the
creation of an enabling environment for the private sector. It is a
concern for rules which are actually applied and institutions which
ensure the appropriate application of these rules, to the extent that
such rules and institutions are required for the economic develop-
ment of the country and in particular for the sound management of
its resources.
4 8
No doubt, the Bank has to address issues of corruption in this
context with great caution, acting on the basis of established facts
and only to the extent that the issues clearly affect the economic
development of the country. It cannot, however, ignore such issues
at a time when they have become a major concern, not only to the
sources of international financial flows but also to business
organizations and indeed to the governments and peoples of most
of its member countries.
B. Ensuring a Corruption-Free Institution
For an institution like the World Bank to take a leading role
in the international efforts to assist its members in curbing
47. See Issues of "Governance" in Borrowing Members - The Extent of Their
Relevance Under the Bank's Articles of Agreement, Legal Memorandum of the
General Counsel, dated Dec. 21, 1990 (SecM91-131, February 5, 1991), also
published as Chapter Two in I.F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING
WORLD, Vol. 1 (1991), and Prohibition of Political Activities in the Bank's Work,
Legal Opinion of the General Counsel, dated July 11, 1995 (SecM95-707, July 12,
1995).
48. For details see I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD,
Vol. 1, 53-96 (1991).
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corruption, it must first introduce adequate safeguards against any
corruption within its ranks. There is no evidence of any major
instance of corruption in the more than 50 years of Bank's history;
few incidents have been promptly dealt with, even harshly in some
cases, according to the Bank's Administrative Tribunal.49  The
Bank's Staff Rules include detailed provisions on conflicts of
interest and the expected behavior of staff in their dealings within
and outside the Bank.5" They require annual financial disclosures
of all assets and financial transactions by senior staff5 1 and
disclosure by all staff of "any financial or business interest of the
staff member or of a member of his immediate family that might
unfavorably reflect on or cause embarrassment to the Bank."52
An Outside Interests Committee, headed by a Deputy General
Counsel, must approve any staff activity unrelated to the perfor-
mance of Bank duties, other than a non-compensated position in
a non-profit corporation or organization, to ensure that it is
compatible with Bank Group work requirements and the principles
of staff employment.53 In addition, a statement on staff ethics,
first issued in 1994, is now to be distributed annually under the
President's signature.54 As part of the recently approved mea-
sures, the Staff Rules will be amended to make termination of
employment mandatory in any case of corrupt or fraudulent
practice resulting in a misuse of Bank funds or other public funds.
They will also clarify the duty of staff to report incidents of
corruption and strengthen the reporting procedures in such cases.
Focal points have been designated to receive corruption-related
complaints and to investigate them or advise on how best they
should be investigated. Programs for increasing staff awareness
about corrupt practices will be launched. Periodic audits of internal
49. So far, three case before the Bank's Administrative Tribunal have involved
fraud committed by Bank staff. In all cases, the Bank had terminated the staff for
defrauding the Bank by submitting exaggerated overtime claims. This sanction
was found, however, to be disproportionate by the Administrative Tribunal. See
W. Carew v. IBRD, Decision 142, WBAT Reports (1995); A. Planthara v. IBRD,
Decision 143, WBAT Reports (1995); Th. D. Smith v. IBRD, Decision 158,
WBAT Reports (1997).
50. See Staff Rule 3.01, Paras. 1.01,4.01-4.06,5.01-5.03,6.01-6.03, (setting forth
the rules governing conflicts of interest including public and private activities of
Bank Staff). See also Principle 3 of the Staff Manual summarizing the general
obligations and general behavior of Bank staff.
51. See Staff Rule 3.01, Paras. 8.01-8.02.
52. See Staff Rule 3.01, Para. 8.01.
53. See Staff Rule 3.01, Paras. 10.01-10.05.
54. See The World Bank Group Code of Professional Ethics.
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activities will also take place over and above the normal auditing
work of the Internal Audit Department, to establish whether any
questionable practice has taken place.
C. Curbing Corruption Under Bank-Financed Loans
While the Bank has long been known for its stringent
measures to insulate the projects financed by it from any possible
corruption, such measures have recently been enhanced in a
number of areas, some of which have broader objectives:
(i) At the early stages of project design, preparation and
appraisal, the Bank now places emphasis on the participation of
affected people and NGOs." Such participation, while serving
other purposes, indirectly improves the accountability of govern-
ment agencies and allows the Bank to hear and verify possible
complaints about corruption, such as the selection of the project
location to accommodate some special interests. Also, during
project appraisal, Bank staff are now required to place emphasis on
confirming the adequacy of the project's accounting system and to
make sure that loan agreements include adequate covenants on
appropriate financial management.
(ii) During project implementation, the Bank now places a
much greater emphasis on supervision, including the actual
observance of auditing requirements. It reviews with borrowers the
Bank's portfolio of on-going projects, both to identify problems and
agree on solutions.5 6 Through such close supervision and review,
questions of corruption, if they arise at all, have a much greater
opportunity to be addressed. The Bank's more open disclosure
policy adopted in 1993 also allows concerned NGOs and the public
at large to play a more effective role in monitoring Bank-financed
projects. 7 The establishment, also in 1993, of the Bank's Inspec-
tion Panel gives affected parties access to an independent mecha-
nism to review alleged deviations by the Bank from its policies and
55. Pursuant to Operational Directive (OD) 14.70, NGOs may become
involved at all stages of a Bank-financed project. Other Operational Directives
such as OD 4.00 on Environmental Policies or OD 4.30 on Involuntary Resettle-
ment ensure the participation of people affected by Bank projects.
56. See Operational Policy Statement (OP) 10.02 which is discussed infra.
57. See Bank Procedure (BP) 17.50 on Disclosure of Operational Information
and the Bank's Operational Policy Statement on Disclosure of Information (OP
17.50).
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procedures with respect to the design, appraisal or implementation
of projects financed or to be financed by it."8
(iii) In the preparation of the periodic Country Assistance
Strategies for each borrowing member and more generally in the
on-going dialogue between Bank staff and government officials,
Bank senior staff are authorized to raise governance issues relevant
to the Bank's mandate. Should an issue related to alleged
corruption under Bank-financed projects arise, it would no doubt
figure prominently in such discussions and might influence the
Bank's position if they are not adequately dealt with by the
government.
(iv) A new Operational Policy Statement and Procedure
(OP/BP 10. 02 - Financial Management) has recently been prepared.
It requires the strengthening of accounting and auditing procedures
for the borrowers and the project implementing agencies with
respect to Bank-financed projects and tightens the rules regarding
the borrowers' compliance with an audit and other financial
covenants in the loan agreements. This OP/BP includes specific
procedures for the suspension of loan disbursement in cases of
prolonged non-observance.
(v) Perhaps more importantly in the context of curbing
corruption, the Bank's rules, applicable to the procurement of goods
and services under its loans, which are incorporated in its loan
agreements, have been further tightened by virtue of new rules and
procedures approved by the Bank's Board on July 23, 1996.
According to these new rules and procedures:
a) The Bank can at any time cancel the financing of any
contract under the loan, not only in cases of misprocurement as
previously stated, but also whenever corrupt or fraudulent practices
were engaged in by representatives of the borrower or a beneficiary
of the loan during the procurement process or the execution of the
contract, unless the borrower takes timely and appropriate action
satisfactory to the Bank to remedy the situation. Both the General
Conditions applicable to IBRD loans and IDA credits, and the
Procurement Guidelines, have been amended to reflect this impor-
tant change.
b) Any supplier/contractor/ consultant financed by a Bank
loan which is found by the Bank, after appropriate investigation
with adequate safeguards, to have engaged in a corrupt or fraudu-
58. See Resolution Establishing the World Bank Inspection Panel (Resolution
No. 93-10; Resolution No. IDA93-6). See also I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK
INSPECTION PANEL (1994).
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lent practice, will be declared by decision of the Bank's President,
upon the recommendation of a high level committee, ineligible to
bid for Bank-financed contracts, for a specific period of time or
indefinitely, according to the gravity of the offense.
c) The Bank will also reject a proposal for the award of a
contract by the borrower if it determines that the bidder recom-
mended for this purpose by the borrower has engaged in corrupt
or fraudulent activities in competing for that contract.
d) The Bank can now require its borrowers to include in the
contracts financed by Bank loans a provision by virtue of which the
Bank will have the right to inspect the accounts and records of the
contractor/ supplier/ consultant concerned relating to the perfor-
mance of the contract and to have them audited by auditors
appointed by the Bank.
e) Bidders for Bank-financed contracts are now required to
disclose in their bids any commissions or other payments paid to
local or foreign agents in the context of the procurement or
execution of such contracts.
(vi) In addition to the above, recently approved measures
include additional, previously unannounced, audits of Bank
operations in a specific country by outside firms, and regular post-
review of procurements on a country basis. Three of the first type
of audits have already started in large borrowing countries.
D. Assisting Borrowing Members in Curbing Corruption
The main vehicle for assisting its members in their fight against
corruption as a general phenomenon is the Bank's policy lending
instruments and its technical assistance loans. Other measures have
also been used by the Bank, however, to good effect.
1. Policy Lending.-Although adjustment lending was
initiated in 1980 to assist countries in improving their economic
performance, many reform measures introduced under structural
and sectoral adjustment loans (and other "rehabilitation" and
"recovery" loans) have indirectly and at times specifically helped
in stemming corruption.59 These have included, in addition to
59. For details on the policy of adjustment lending as a response to macro-
economic disturbances in the 1980s in most developing countries, see The Social
Impact of Adjustment Operations: An Overview (World Bank Operations
Evaluation Department, Report No. 14776, 1995) and Structural and Sectoral
Adjustment: World Bank Experience 1980-1992 (World Bank Operations
Evaluation Department, Report No. 14691, 1995); see also World Development
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general measures of deregulation, liberalization and privatization
which aim at replacing administrative dictates with market
mechanisms, such specific measures as the following:
a) The introduction of banking laws and regulations to ensure
the health of the financial sector and also to strengthen controls
over fraudulent and imprudent practices and money laundering;
b) The introduction of tax laws and regulations, not only to
simplify tax structures and reduce tax rates but also to improve tax
administration and collection;
c) The introduction or amendment of procurement laws,
regulations and documents as well as measures of financial manage-
ment, not only for development projects but more generally of the
government budget, accounting and auditing systems;
d) Less specific measures of legal and judicial reform have
also been introduced in the context of policy based lending,
especially under sectoral adjustment loans in situations where
agreement was reached with the borrower on the pressing need and
the feasibility of short term actions;
e) Specific civil service reform measures have often been
agreed under adjustment loans, especially for downsizing and pay
increases.
2. Technical Assistance and Sectoral Investment Loans.-Both
free standing loans and components of technical assistance and
sectoral investment loans have covered Bank financing of legal and
regulatory reform, civil service reform, judicial reform and public
sector reform, all with potential direct or indirect effects on the
opportunities for and level of corruption.' While relatively large
free standing loans have been made in recent years for legal and/or
judicial reform in countries as diverse as Venezuela, Bolivia, China,
Russia and Ecuador, public sector reform and civil service reform
loans started earlier and have covered a large number of countries.
The recently agreed measures by the Bank's top management to
assist in combating corruption include the broadening of activities
in these fields as may be needed in the circumstances of each
country.
3. Bank Grants.-Since the establishment by the Bank of its
Institutional Development Fund (IDF) as a trust fund to provide
Report - Poverty 104-20 (World Bank 1990).
60. For a general overview of legal technical assistance by the Bank, see the
World Bank and Legal Technical Assistance (World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 1414, 1995).
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grants to borrowers for capacity building purposes (other than
project preparation, which may be financed by other types of Bank
grants), a number of grants have been made for purposes such as
the preparation of new legislation, public procurement and
associated training, or the carrying out of studies which diagnose
the problems of the civil service or the judiciary. Some of these
studies paved the way for technical assistance loans for these
sectors. Among the recently agreed measures, IDF grants will also
be made for capacity building in accounting and auditing in
borrowing countries. Other grants have already financed a number
of surveys to assess the level of delivery of public services in some
borrowing countries.
4. Seminars by the Economic Development Institute
(EDI).-EDI has pioneered a number of "Integrity Workshops" for
specific countries to increase awareness of the causes and economic
effects of corruption. These seminars are planned to cover more
countries in the future. EDI has also provided training for
economic journalists. Recently agreed measures for the Bank to
assist in combating corruption include new procurement seminars
to be provided by EDI for the training of specialists in borrowing
countries.
5. Bank Research.-Corruption has been researched on a few
occasions by Bank staff as a separate topic but has been more
regularly addressed under more general reports. Examples include
the two Bank reports on governance issues published in 1992 and
1994, private sector assessment reports carried out for most
borrowing countries, service delivery surveys (financed mostly by
IDF grants), surveys of manufacturing enterprises in transition
economies, a few Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) reports and
the 1996 World Development Report (WDR) on Transition. The
1997 WDR, which will deal with "The State in a Changing World,"
will treat the issue of corruption in a broader and more detailed
manner. In depth analysis of the causes of corruption, the
empirical evidence of its impact on development, and how best to
address it in Bank's lending and non-lending operations, is now
being considered as possible subjects to be specifically addressed by
Bank research.
V. Conclusion
Although corruption can be seen in a much broader context,
it has been addressed here mainly in terms of the use of public
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office or trust for private gain, the abuse of a public or private
position in favor of the position-holder, his family, friends or
bribers and the selective or arbitrary application of public rules to.
benefit the official in charge and those who pay him for the favor.
Its causes and effects, both on the parties to a corrupt deal and on
the society at large, have been discussed from different angles. In
spite of direct material benefits to the corrupting and corrupt
parties and possible facilitating effect on business transactions, the
long term effects of corruption are found to be negative on the
society, its government, law, ethics and economy. Businessmen
may be content to live with it as long as it is fairly predictable, and
the poor may accept it as a fact of life, but its devastating distribu-
tional effects are increasingly recognized on a world-wide scale.
In practically all societies, corruption has been recognized as
a social malaise, if not a religious sin. However, its manifestations
continue to exist in varying degrees in all societies. Measures to
combat it have also had different degrees of success but have
generally been more effective when they followed a comprehensive
approach and combined the efforts of governments with those of
business groups and non-governmental organizations.
Both in theory and practice, many ways have been proposed
to achieve the reduction of corruption. However, as the discussion
in this paper demonstrates, these proposals may remain empty
gestures in the absence of some basic requirements: (i) real
commitment from national and local leadership at the political and
administrative levels, (ii) a broad and sustained campaign by civil
society to keep that commitment alive, (iii) institutional capacity to
implement and enforce, (iv) public disclosure and a free flow of
information, (v) a social enabling environment of norms and values
supportive of anti-corruption measures, (vi) the adoption by
multinational corporations and international agencies of standards
and practices which address corruption with a view to fighting it in
their work, and (vii) international cooperative efforts to deal with
trans-boundary corrupt and fraudulent practices.
International conditions seem to be more conducive now than
any time in the past to address corruption as an issue of global
concern. With the greater liberalization of trade and investment,
the gradual globalization of the market place and overwhelming
advances in technology, corruption is becoming not only a common
domestic problem but an international problem as well. It is being
recognized as a development issue in view of its possible impact on
the cost of transactions, the volume of external flows, the stability
and predictability of the investment environment, and eventually
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the rate of growth itself. Inevitably, it has become a concern for
the world's premier development finance institution.
The World Bank has already played an extensive role in the
fight against corruption, a role which goes beyond the confines of
the activities of its staff and the projects it finances. As corruption
becomes a major issue of development policy, with respect to aid,
trade and investment, the Bank's role is bound to increase and take
on new dimensions. Chances of success in this complex area are
more limited, but the expected impact on development may well be
worth the effort.

